Making IP = PSPACE Practical: Efficient Interactive Protocols for BDD Algorithms

Philipp Czerner¹


collaboration with

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July 30, 2023

Outline



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Is this formula satisfiable?

$$(x \lor y \lor \neg z)$$

$$\land (\neg x \lor \neg z \lor w)$$

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No...

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
$$\land (x \lor \neg y \lor \neg z \lor w)$$

No... at least my SAT-solver says so!


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7

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- ► Use certification each answer comes with a machine-checkable certificate




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
▶ It suffices to ensure correctness of the certificate checker

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
SAT – boolean satisfiability




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QBF – quantified boolean satisfiability



This talk applies to QBF as well.

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- ► Used for (UN)SAT, QBF
- Essentially a list of clauses, each of which is implied by the previous clauses
- ► Properties:
 - "efficiently" checkable
 - ► long (exponential in size of the input)
- ► Certificates can be many terabytes (!) in size
 - e.g. 200 TiB in [Heule, Kullmann, Marek 2016] to solve the boolean Pythagorean Triples problem

The problem

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- ► In some cases, it can take even longer to verify the proof than to solve the instance (!)


Polynomial-time certification?!

No.


No. However...


- ► certainty
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 - ▶ i.e. SAT, QBF, model counting, ...

Verifier Prover





Verifier



Prover




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Prover



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
Verifier




Prover





Verifier




Prover









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
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- ▶ IP is the class of problems that admit such a protocol

Interactive Protocols – Summary



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- ► Split performance-critical and trusted parts of software

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
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
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Problem: how do we generate interactive certificates with practical approaches?


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- ► Unique encoding of boolean functions with efficient boolean operations
- ► Are used effectively for QBF, CTL model checking (and many other problems)
 - ▶ not as good for SAT, though



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where T is the time the BDD algorithm takes to solve φ .

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Theorem. Let φ denote a QBF instance with n variables.

- 1. Verifier executes in time $\mathcal{O}(n^2|\varphi|)\approx 0$, with negligible failure probability $\approx 10^{-10}$, and
- 2. Prover takes $\mathcal{O}(T) \approx 3T$ time to solve φ and answer Verifier's challenges,

where T is the time the BDD algorithm takes to solve φ .

(constants in practice)


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
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
- ► We implement our approach as blic, a certifying QBF solver
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- ▶ DepQBF and PGBDDQ are certifying as well, using extended resolution proofs
- ► Benchmarks are taken from the crafted instances track of the QBF Evaluation 2022




Time to verify certificate (Verifier / external specialised checkers)



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Thank you for your attention! Questions?

Bonus Slides

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- ► Integrate BDD optimisations, e.g. garbage collection, sifting

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"The key was with you all along..."

- ► We can re-use both the existing interactive protocol SUMCHECK and BDD-algorithms from the literature
- Only minor adjustments are needed

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"... and the real treasure was the friends you made along the way."

- ▶ BDDs uniquely represent binary multilinear polynomials used in SUMCHECK
- ► Intermediate results from the BDD-computations encode the answers to Verifier's challenges

